From Businesses to Prisons: an Analysis of How COVID-19 Restrictions Impacted the Italian Public in the Early Stages of the Pandemic By: Olivia Tucker
Italy was one of the first countries severely impacted by COVID-19, with some scholars referring to the pandemic as the most “serious event in Italian history after World War II; it is a national human, health, and economic tragedy.”[1] It is estimated that during the early stages of the pandemic, the COVID-19 mortality in Italy was 9%, higher than that in China.[2] Italy’s healthcare system has previously been recognized as one of the more advantageous systems, however, recently, its health policies have changed, and “regional autonomy has accentuated inequalities in the quality of services.”[3] Prior to the pandemic, Italy had been suffering from workforce shortages in the healthcare sector, partially due to its ageing medical workforce.[4] Additionally, Italy has fewer nurses than nearly all western European countries, excluding Spain.[5] Thus, the Italian healthcare system was at a disadvantage once the first COVID-19 case was reported in February 2020.[6]
Italy was the first democracy to implement restrictive lockdown measures to slow the spread of COVID-19.[7] In early February 2020 when the first case was reported, the Italian Council of Ministers declared a state of emergency, which is authorized under the Civil Protection Code, allowing the President of the Council of Ministers to adopt “exceptional measures in the event of a natural disaster.”[8]
To combat the spread of COVID-19, Italy was divided into different zones based on the occurrence of new cases and hospitalization rates: red, orange, yellow, and white.[9] Red zones had the most stringent restrictions, including the closure of all “non-essential economic activities,” restrictions on meeting friends or relatives at home, and restrictions on leaving one’s residence except for specific reasons.[10] In orange zones, restrictions were less stringent, though cafes and restaurants were still closed, and in yellow zones, economic activities could remain open with certain limitations.[11]White zones had the least restrictive limitations, with the sole requirement of mask use indoors.[12] In red zones in the early stages of the pandemic, the violation of any set forth restrictions amounted to a criminal offense punishable pursuant to Article 650 of the Italian Penal Code.[13] Furthermore, individuals who tested positive or defied mandatory quarantine provisions could be prosecuted pursuant to Article 438 or 452 of the Penal Code.[14]
These seemingly harsh measures in red and orange zones particularly were justified by the Italian Government in the early stages of the pandemic on economic grounds, as Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte emphasized that Italy “must act, deploying all the measures necessary to avert a new generalized lockdown. The country cannot afford a new setback which would severely jeopardize the whole economy.”[15] These stringent measures were not indefinite, however. In May of 2020, the Government adopted Decree-Law No 33, which aimed at allowing the resumption of previously suspended activities, with caution.[16] With respect to freedom of worship, this decree allowed the celebration of religious rites “in compliance with the protocols signed by the Government and their respective religious denominations containing the appropriate measures to prevent the risk of contagion.”[17]
In response to governmental limitations on how places of business could operate, lawsuits were brought by businesses who could not afford their rent during the pandemic.[18] In 2020, the Tribunal of Venice ruled in favor of a lessee of a clothing store who had 50,000€ of unpaid bills as a result of reduction in business due to the lockdown measures in place.[19] The Tribunal issued a temporary order preventing the creditors from enforcing collateral against the lessees.[20] Additionally, for commercial leases of gyms, pools, and sports facilities, a 50% monthly rent deduction was provided between March and July of 2020.[21]
Not only were the effects of the Italian response to COVID-19 felt from an economic perspective; Italian prisoners also faced significant hardship, primarily due to overcrowding.[22] In April 2020, there were over 56,000 prisoners held in Italian prisons initially built for a maximum of 4,7000, an occupancy level of 121.75%.[23] In March of 2020, there were several riots in Italian prisons in response to the implementation of a COVID-related ban on family visits, and an “increasing risk of contagion” among the prison population due to overcrowding.[24] Fourteen prisoners were killed and hundreds of prison officers were injured during the riots.[25] The property damages amounted to tens of millions of euros, and reduced the prison system’s capacity by 2,000.[26] In an effort to reduce the population, certain prisoners with underlying health complications were released, including several mafia bosses, resulting in public outrage.[27]
In another attempt to reduce overcrowding, a legislative decree was passed that allowed for sentences under 18 months, or sentences with under 18 months left to serve, to be served under house arrest.[28] Even though this measure would seemingly be effective, from the public’s perspective, the legislation has significantly reduced individual rights in order to protect public health.[29] Furthermore, the decree did not provide for what has been commonly identified as the basis of prevention: conducting tests in order to map persons who test positive for COVID-19.[30]
Italy seemed to be ill-equipped to fight the COVID-19 pandemic due to its revised healthcare system and shortages in doctors and nurses.[31] In response to the high rates at which cases developed, the country implemented a unique colored-zone system, where stringent restrictions were set forth in red zones, the most affected areas.[32] Not only did these restrictions effect Italy’s economy and the ability of businesses to pay their rent,[33] but prisoners’ rights were also affected, resulting in riots and legislative reform to reduce prison populations.[34]
[1] Flaminia Aperio Bella, et. al., “The Role of COVID-19 Soft Law Measures in Italy: Much Ado About Nothing?,” Eur. J. Risk Regul. (Feb. 9, 2021). https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8060623/
[2] Id.
[3] Ciro Indolfi & Carmen Spaccarotella, “The Outbreak of COVID-19 in Italy: Fighting the Pandemic,” 2 JACC Case Rep. No. 9 (2020)
[4] Iris Bosa et. al., “Response to COVID-19: was Italy (un)prepared?” 17 Health Econ. Policy Law (Jan 2021).
[5] Id.
[6] See generally, Id.; Giselda Vagnoni, “Coronavirus came to Italy almost 6 months before the first official case, new study shows,” World Economic Forum (Nov. 16, 2020) https://www.weforum.org/stories/2020/11/coronavirus-italy-covid-19-pandemic-europe-date-antibodies-study/.
[7] Laura Maria Franciosi, “Covid-19 and the Italian Legal System,” 15 J. of Civil Law Studies, 365, 367 (Dec. 13, 2023).
[8] Francesco Alicino, Italy’s Secularity and Freedom of Religion under the COVID-19 Pandemic, in “Religion, Law, and COVID-19 in Europe: A Comparative Analysis,” 143, 146 Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
[9] Laura Maria Franciosi, supra note 7, at 368-69.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Alessandra Spadaro, “Do the containment measures taken by Italy in relation to COVID-19 comply with human rights law?” EJIL (Mar. 16, 2020) https://www.ejiltalk.org/do-the-containment-measures-taken-by-italy-in-relation-to-covid-19-comply-with-human-rights-law/.
[14] Id.
[15] Rebecca Ann Hughes, “Italy’s New ‘Soft’ Coronavirus Measures Prioritize the Economy,” Forbes (Dec. 16 2020).
[16] Flaminia Aperio Bella, et. al., supra note 1.
[17] Id.
[18] Laura Maria Franciosi, supra note 7, at 374.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] See generally Mariano Cingolani, “The COVID-19 Epidemic and the Prison System in Italy, 27 J. of Correctional Health Care 3 (2021).
[23] Id. at 3.
[24] Sergio Nazzaro et. al., “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy’s prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic - and by the mafia” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (May 20, 2020) https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/italy-prisons-covid/
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Mariano Cingolani, supra note 22, at 4.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] See generally Ciro Indolfi & Carmen Spaccarotella, supra note 3.
[32] Laura Maria Franciosi, supra note 7, at 368-69.
[33] Id.
[34] Mariano Cingolani, supra note 22, at 4.