Funding peace. How the international Community’s failure at resolving South Sudan’s conflict highlights the need for increased funding of democratic elections By: Benjamin Kaiser

The world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan, is at a pivotal moment.[1] After years of fighting and a hard won yet fragile peace, South Sudan’s President, Salva Kiir, has arrested and detained the country’s First Vice President, Reik Machar Teny.[2] This move has thrown South Sudan’s efforts to implement the nation’s conflict resolution agreement into turmoil.[3] However, this move by Kiir is only the last in a long line of decisions resulting from a political stalemate between the international community and South Sudanese groups vying for power.[4]

Background

After Sudan was freed from British colonial rule in 1956, conflict between the nation’s southern and northern regions resulted in decades of conflict and civil war.[5] In 2005, the civil war came to an end leading to South Sudan’s Independence in 2011.[6] Yet, the new nation suffered from multiple internal conflicts and was plagued by its own civil war.[7] However, a new peace was found in 2018 when four parties came together to sign a power sharing agreement. [8]

The Revitalized agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS or the “Agreement”) was entered into by the ruling transitional government; two main opposition groups, the South Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), a conglomerate of other opposition parties (OPP), and a group of former prisoners of South Sudan’s civil war (FD).[9] The agreement provided a framework for establishing a transitional unified government, the creation and funding of political institutions, and parameters for a future permanent constitution.[10]

The transitional government is composed of all the signatories to the agreement and several other non-signatory parties.[11] The Agreement provides the transitional government with a mandate to “Reconstitute a competent and independent National elections Commission (NEWC to conduct free fair and credible elections before the end of the Transitional Period and insure that the outcome reflect the will of the people.”[12]

However, implementing the agreement has been plagued by a lack of political will, low trust among the parties, and poor funding.[13] The timeline for implementing the Agreement has been pushed back four times, and the delay has kept the country from holding its first elections.[14] After the most recent postponement, elections have been scheduled for December of 2026.[15]

The Problem

The Agreement appointed Kiir to the office of President and Teeny to the office of First Vice president, with four other vice presidents to be nominated by the signatories.[16] In this transition period, previously warring factions have been directly appointed to positions  of government from the president down to county level bureaucrats.[17] Now in power, there is little incentive for appointed officials to do the work necessary for providing elections.[18] Elections may bring democratic legitimacy, but they may also be a vehicle for losing power to your historic enemies.[19]

Further, some of previously warring factions appointed to high office still maintain separate militias.[20] South Sudanese election law requires political parties to relinquish their armed forces before they can register for political office.[21] The Agreement provided for a unification of armed forces, but parties have delayed doing so.[22] Without relinquishing militias, many of the ruling factions will lose out on fielding candidates in the upcoming elections.[23]

Complicating matters more, there are logistical problems with how the election will be organized and funded.[24] South Sudan has struggled with identifying how to hold an election across in a mostly rural county without solid transportation and funding.[25] Certainly some progress is being made.[26] The National Elections Commission has formed, created a website, and rolled out a voter education strategy.[27] However, South Sudanese officials have made clear that the country will need more than $440 million in funding to conduct elections in 2026.[28]

So far, the international community has refused to provide these funds.[29] Nicholas Haysom, the Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, has publicly stated that international financing will not occur until the South Sudanese transitional government provides demonstrable proof that it has the political will to implement its electoral program.[30]

Moving Forward

After Vice President Tenny’s arrest by President Kiir and numerous electoral delays, it is clear that the Agreement and the transitional government it created have been ineffective.[31] A quasi stalemate exists between a transitional government with few resources or incentives to hold elections and an international community who won’t provide funding and logistical support until they see more action.[32] In between are the south Sudanese people who desperately want and election to take place but fear one will not be forthcoming.[33]

The international community can sit on the sidelines and permit this dynamic to keep worsening or it can take active steps.[34]  A study conducted by the Rift Valley Institute highlights that international funding has a role to play in pushing for constitutional change in South Sudan.[35] The institute recommends that international funders focus on the power of everyday South Sudanese people.[36] This bottom-up approach empowers the people directly to solve logistical and transportation issues affecting the upcoming election.[37] It may not be enough, but solutions like these have the advantage of sidestepping the current power dynamic and provide direct support to the people on the ground suffering the harms of the present situation.[38]

In the stalemate between the international community and the transitional government, more should be done to support people on the ground budling power and finding solutions.

[1][1] See generally Detention of South Sudan’s VP Machar Cancels Peace Deal, His Party Says, Reuters (Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-urges-south-sudan-president-release-vp-machar-who-is-reportedly-under-house-2025-03-27/; Peter Birajak, The World’s Newest Nation is Unraveling, Time (Jan. 25, 2024), https://time.com/6565544/south-sudan-unraveling/.

[2] Id.

[3] See Id; Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Sept. 12, 2018, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf [hereinafter Agreement].

[4] See generally Niki Kindersley, Elections in South Sudan: Lessons From Everyday Democracy, Just Future (2025), https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/South-Sudan-Election-Delays_final.pdf.

[5] Center for Preventative Action, Instability in South Sudan, Council on Foreign Rels (Mar. 21, 2025), https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Shola Lawal, Fighting Flares in South Sudan: Is the 2018 Peace Deal in Danger?, AlJazeera (Mar. 7, 2025),https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/7/fighting-flares-in-south-sudan-is-the-2018-peace-deal-in-danger.

[9] The Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS): Addressing the Challenges to Power Sharing, Int’l Inst. for Strategic Stud. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/No.-17.-The-Revitalized-Agreement-for-Resolution-of-Conflict-in-South-Sudan-R-ARCSS-1.pdf

[10] Agreement, supra note 3, at p ii-iii.

[11] Agreement, supra note 3, at Section 1.1.

[12] Agreement, supra note 3, at Section 1.2.13

[13] Press release, Security Council, No Appetite for Another Extension of South Sudan Peace Agreement, Mission Head Tells Security Council, Urging Leaders Focus on Benchmarks Without Delay, U.N Press Release SC.16989 (Feb. 5, 2025).

[14] Luka Biong Deng, What Could End the Long Postponement of South Sudan’s First Elections, Int’l Peace Inst. Glob. Observatory (Oct. 15, 2024), https://theglobalobservatory.org/2024/10/what-could-end-the-long-postponement-of-south-sudans-first-elections/.

[15] Security Council, supra note 13.

[16] Agreement, supra note 3, at Section 1.5.1 - 1.5.2

[17] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 5.

[18] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 5.

[19] See generally Kindersley, supra note 4, at 5.

[20] Press Release, supra note 13.

[21] Press Release, supra note 13.

[22] See Press Release, supra note 13.

[23] See Press Release, supra note 13.

[24] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 28.

[25] Kindersley, supra note 4at 29.

[26] See Press Release, supra note 13.

[27] Press Release, supra note 13.

[28] South Sudan Requires over $440m to Conduct 2026 Elections: Official, Sudan Trib. (Sept. 19, 2024), https://sudantribune.com/article291101/.

[29] See Priyanka Chowdhury, Top UN Official Urges Political, Financial Investments by South Sudan’s Leaders to Complete Transition, UNMISS (Oct. 10, 2024), https://unmiss.unmissions.org/top-un-official-urges-political-financial-investments-south-sudan%E2%80%99s-leaders-complete-transition.

[30] Id.

[31] See John Shelton, South Sudan Peace Deal Unravels Ager VP’s Arrest, DW (Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-peace-deal-unravels-after-vps-arrest/a-72062487

[32] See generally Sudan Tribune, supra note 28; Chowdhury, supra  note 29.

[33] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 5.

[34] See generally Kindersley, supra note 4, at 42.

[35] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 42.

[36] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 42

[37] Kindersley, supra note 4, at 42

[38] See generally Kindersley, supra note 4, at 42