When a Flood Becomes a Governance Failure: How Valencia Exposed the Legal Gaps in Spain’s Climate-Risk Framework By: Christina Marshall

The catastrophic flooding that hit Spain’s Valencian Community was, on its surface, a natural disaster.[1] However, the aftermath revealed something much deeper; the more details emerge, the clearer it becomes that the problem was not simply the rain.[2] It was a stress test of Spain’s constitutional, administrative, and European-law structures.[3] And many of those structures failed.[4]

Valencia’s flooding began with a DANA, the Mediterranean weather pattern known for sudden, intense rainfall.[5] This flood, however, shattered historical records.[6] Entire neighborhoods were submerged, critical infrastructure collapsed, and the death toll reached more than 200 people.[7] This caused families to be displaced overnight and emergency crews overwhelmed.[8] The scale of the damage triggered immediate public anger,[9] but beneath that anger lay a more complex problem: a system of climate-risk governance that remains reactive rather than preventative.[10] The devastation poses a question: why did a region that already knows it is flood-prone[11] still end up so unprepared?

Spain’s constitutional structure is a hybrid between decentralization and federal-style autonomy.[12] The 1978 Constitution gives autonomous communities like Valencia broad control over land-use planning, environmental protection, and emergency response.[13] In theory, this allows regions to tailor flood-prevention strategies to their geography.[14] In practice, however, decentralization often creates overlapping responsibilities and blurred lines when a crisis hits.[15]

In the Valencian Community, civil-protection responsibilities are governed by Law 13/2010 on Civil Protection and Emergency Management, which establishes the region’s emergency-response structure through the Valencian Agency for Security and Emergency Response.[16] Municipalities, in turn, are required to prepare and maintain municipal emergency plans that align with the regional territorial plan.[17] Law 17/2015 created the National Civil Protection System, and authorizes its activation in situations of national interest, confirming the state’s coordinating role across sub-national civil-protection systems.[18] Under this law, a region must declare a national emergency for national civil protection system intervention.[19] This division of labor is designed to share responsibility, but in extreme events can produce delays, conflicting directives and unclear command structures.[20]

The early-warning issues during this storm seemed to expose these cracks. Spain’s meteorological agency issued strong alerts several days before landfall,[21] yet local officials reported delays in receiving key updates.[22] Several municipalities waited too long to close roads or move residents, leaving them vulnerable and unprepared.[23] Valencia’s regional leader, Carlos Mazón, was heavily criticized for waiting more than 12 hours to issue text alerts, choosing instead to have lunch with a with a journalist.[24] Mazón, on the contrary, argued that he didn’t have the information from state agencies to warn his community.[25] Under Spain decentralized legal structure, the Spanish Military Emergency Unit (UME) was already positioned in several affected towns, but could not act without a formal mandate from the regional authorities.[26] That authorization never came because no national emergency had been declared.[27]

The lack of a unified response framework also meant that actions varied widely from one region to another.[28] Some areas moved quickly with evacuations, while others hesitated, creating confusion and putting more people at risk.[29] A more consistent, coordinated structure would have likely ensured that residents across all regions received the same level of timely protection. What occurred was not only an obvious communication failure, but also the evidence of legal gaps and administrative weaknesses.

Then there is the European Union.

Under the EU Flood Directive, member states must assess flood risks, file adaptation plans, and coordinate emergency responses.[30] Although Spain formally meets many of these obligations,[31] meeting obligations on paper is not the same as developing an integrated climate-risk system. The European Environment Agency has warned that Spain’s adaptation efforts, especially in Mediterranean regions, do not match the pace of current and projected climate impacts.[32] The EU framework assumes national coordination.[33] Spain’s structure assumes regional autonomy.[34]

A particularly important legal issue raised by the floods involves foreseeability.[35] As climate modeling becomes more sophisticated, governments cannot rely on the argument that extreme events were impossible to predict.[36] If meteorologists warned of severe rainfall and authorities failed to act, the legal definition of negligence begins to shift.[37] This is why prosecutors in Spain have already opened investigations into whether officials ignored serious warnings or failed to act on information they had.[38]

These investigations signal a broader shift. Governments are increasingly judged not only on how they respond to disasters, but also on whether they prepared for risks they should have foreseen.[39] Germany faced similar scrutiny in 2021 after deadly floods.[40] The United States was criticized for delayed evacuations and aid delivery during Hurricane Katrina.[41] Valencia may soon join this developing pattern of climate-related accountability.[42]

The larger issue at hand is that climate change is converting environmental hazards into governance failures.[43] Legal structures designed for slower, more stable conditions are struggling under the speed and volatility of modern climate events.[44] Spain’s system calls for clearer command structures, faster decision-making authority during emergencies, and adaptation laws built for the climate of today and tomorrow.[45] The EU may also consider stronger enforcement mechanisms regarding adaptation plans, while local governments rethink coordination and forward-looking risk assessments.[46]

[1] Eva Mañez & David Latona, A Year On, Leader of Spain’s Valencia Region Quits Over Deadly Floods, Reuters (Nov. 3, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/leader-spains-valencia-region-resigns-over-handling-last-years-deadly-floods-2025-11-03/.

[2] Id. (Explaining how “[t]he floods sparked a lengthy blame game” between the national and regional governments).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Sascha Pare, What Is DANA? The Strange Weather Phenomenon That Has Caused Deadly Flooding in Spain, LiveScience (Oct. 31, 2024), https://www.livescience.com/planet-earth/weather/what-is-dana-the-strange-weather-phenomenon-that-has-caused-deadly-flooding-in-spain (“The cause of this disastrous weather is a phenomenon that forms in the Mediterranean called a Depresión Aislada en Niveles Altos (DANA), a Spanish phrase that translates to isolated depression at high levels”).

[6] Id.

[7] Atika Shubert, Spain Floods: Warning ‘Too Late’ for Some Residents, CNN (Nov. 1, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/01/europe/spain-floods-warning-too-late-intl.

[8] Id.

[9] Sam Jones, Valencia President Carlos Mazón Resigns Over Botched Handling of Deadly Floods, The Guardian (Nov. 3, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/03/valencia-president-carlos-mazon-resigns-deadly-floods-spain.

[10] Id.

[11] Shubert, supra note 7 (“This is the worst natural disaster Valencia has seen in decades . . . [b]ut it is not unprecedented. Valencia suffered a similar deadly flood in October 1957 caused by the same seasonal weather phenomenon known as a Gota Fria or a Cold Drop”).

[12] See Art. 2, C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).

[13] See Art. 45, C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).

[14] Susana Galera Rodrigo, Mercedes Alda-Fernandez & Mario Kölling, Climate Governance and Federalism in Spain 263-64 (Alan Fenna, Sébastien Jodoin & Joana Setzer eds., 2023).

[15] Id.

[16] See Candela Navarro Casquete, Disaster Recovery in Spain: A Legal and Policy Survey 14-15 (2022) https://disasterlaw.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/media/disaster_law/2023-02/Spain%20-%20Final.pdf.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Casquete, supra note 16, at 5.

[20] Mañez & Latona, supra note 1 (“Mazón said no one foresaw the local river gorge would overflow, blaming national weather agency AEMET and the body regulating the regional hydrological network, overseen by Spain's Energy and Environment Ministry, for failing to adequately warn of the impending disaster”).

[21] AEMET Releases First Report on Valencia’s Devastating DANA, The Int’l Rep. (Nov. 29, 2024), https://theinternationalreporter.com/aemet-report-dana-valencia/#:~:text=AEMET%20began%20issuing%20warnings,nine%20days%20before%20the.

[22] Mañez & Latona, supra note 1.

[23] Daniel Silva, Tens of Thousands Protest on Anniversary of Deadly Spain Flood, RNZ (Oct. 26, 2025), https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/576966/tens-of-thousands-protest-on-anniversary-of-deadly-spain-flood.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Shivangi Chavda, The 2024 Spain Floods: Failures in Early Warning, Action, Coordination, and Localisation, PreventionWeb (Dec. 2, 2024), https://www.preventionweb.net/news/2024-spain-floods-failures-early-warning-action-coordination-and-localisation.

[27] Id.; see also Casquete, supra note 16, at 5.

[28] Chavda, supra note 26.

[29] Chavda, supra note 26.

[30] Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks.

[31] Jessica Bernal Borrego, Outdated Regulations and Institutional Vulnerability: Hydrological Risk Management in Malaga’s Municipal Planning, 9 Heliyon 1, 2 (2023) (“[T]he Floods Directive is transposed into Spanish law by Royal Decree 903/2010, of July 9, on the assessment and management of flood risks”).

[32] Rodrigo, Fernandez & Kölling, supra, note 14 at 267.

[33] Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks.

[34] See Art. 2, C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).

[35] EHN Curators, Valencia Flood Disaster Sparks Criminal Probe Into Government Response, EHN (June 11, 2025), https://www.ehn.org/valencia-flood-disaster-sparks-criminal-probe-into-government-response#:~:text=climate%20change-,Valencia%20flood%20disaster%20sparks%20criminal%20probe%20into%20government%20response,schedule%20as%20the%20crisis%20unfolded.

[36] Extreme Downpours Increasing in Southeastern Spain as Fossil-Fuel Emissions Heat the Climate, World Weather Attribution (Nov. 4, 2024), https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/extreme-downpours-increasing-in-southern-spain-as-fossil-fuel-emissions-heat-the-climate/#:~:text=heavy%201-day%20rainfall%20events%2C,preindustrial%20climate%20without%20human-caused (Describing the weather changes in Valencia and how predictable heavy rainfall has become in the region).

[37] Chico Harlan, Michael Robinson Chávez & Roser Toll Pifarré, Valencia’s Flood was a Catastrophe. Was it also a Crime?, The Washington Post (June 10, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2025/06/10/spain-floods-valencia-criminal-investigation/.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Mañez & Latona, supra note 1.

[44] Christina Thykjaer, One year after Valencia’s deadly flooding, experts warn it could happen again, Euronews (Oct. 29, 2025), https://www.euronews.com/green/2025/10/29/one-year-after-valencias-deadly-flooding-experts-warn-it-could-happen-again#:~:text=%22The%20most%20vulnerable%20areas,that%20extreme%20events%20will.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.